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Would nonprofit workers accept to earn less? Evidence 
from France
Mathieu NARCY
CEE and ERMES.
CEE – “Le Descartes I”, 29 promenade Michel Simon,  93166 Noisy Le Grand, France.
Tel : +33 (0)1 45 92 69 58 – Email : mathieu.narcy@cee.enpc.fr
Abstract
This paper focuses on wage differentials between french nonprofit, for-profit and 
public sectors. Considering the public sector allows to test more extensively the labor 
donation theory (Preston, 1989). The findings support this theory because nonprofit
workers accept to earn significantly less than they would earn in the for-profit and 
public sectors. They also suggest differences in th  motivations of workers in these 
sectors. Nonprofit workers are attracted to their work for reasons transcending 
material compensation.
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1. Introduction
The nonprofit sector constitutes a significant and expanding segment of the 
French economy. Today, it generates around 3.2% of the gross national product. It is 
also a large employer with a total of more than one million full-time equivalent paid 
workers, a share of 5% of the total salaries in all industries1. This total employment 
increased by 19.4% between 1999 and 2005. Although the nonprofit employment is 
very important in France, very little attention has been paid to the compensation of 
nonprofit workers. This paper aims to fill this gap.
Nonprofit organizations are characterized by the “nondistribution constraint”, 
i.e. the prohibition to distribute profits to those who are in charge of the organization 
(Hansman, 1980). Moreover, their objectives are to produce goods and services that 
generate social benefits and/or to insure the consumer to receive high quality 
products and services in markets characterized by informational asymmetries. In fact, 
nonprofit organizations often dominate human and social services aspects of our 
economy. These characteristics of nonprofit sector are assumed to have effect on the 
labor market. Wages paid in nonprofit organizations should vary from those paid in 
comparable for-profit and public organizations.
Labor donation theory (Preston, 1989) postulates that both the moral and 
ethical goals of nonprofit organizations and the nature of their goods and services 
aimed at generating social benefits will attract workers who have a lower interest in 
monetary rewards. Consequently, they may be willing to work at nonprofit 
organizations at a lower wage than they could have obtained elsewhere because they 
derive a compensating utility from assisting with production in which they find 
social value.
Many American studies estimated the wage differential between the nonprofit 
and for-profit sectors in order to test the labor donation theory2. These studies 
obtained equivocal results. Some of them support Preston’s theory while others do 
not. Among these studies, few addressed self-selection of workers into sector 
although selectivity bias may account for a portion of the wage differential. 
1
 Nonprofit organizations are also an important part of the American economy. In 1995, there were 9.6 
million full-time equivalent paid workers in nonprofit sector and nonprofit employment accounted for 
8.8% of the gross national product (see Salamon et al., 1999).
2 See, for example, Preston (1989), Holtmann and Idson (1993), Hallock (2000), Ruhm and Borkoski 
(2003), Mocan and Teikin (2003).
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Moreover, all these studies assumed that each worker onliy faces two choices –
working in the nonprofit sector or working in the for-profit sector – and disregarded 
the possibility that workers may decide to be employed in the public sector.
This paper focuses on wage differentials between nonprofit, for-profit and 
public sectors while allowing for the endogeneity of sector choice. Considering the 
public sector is useful for at least two reasons. First, it allows to test more extensively 
the labor donation theory. In fact, nonprofit workers really “donate labor” to their 
employers by accepting reduced compensation if they earn less in the nonprofit 
sector than they would earn not only in the for-profit sector but also in the public 
sector. Second, to take all workers employment opportunity into consideration leads 
to a better selection bias correction when we will estimate the wage equations and 
the wage differentials between sectors.
Using the French Labor Force Survey over the 1994-2001 period, a 
multinomial logit selection model is estimated in order to study the wage 
differentials between nonprofit, for-profit and public sectors. This research is original 
for at least two reasons. First, to the best our knowledge, it is the first to estimate the 
wage differentials between these three sectors while correcting selection bias. Some 
studies have analyzed the selectivity-corrected wage differential between public and 
for-profit sectors (see, for example, Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Dustmann and 
Van Soest, 1998) and others between nonprofit and for-profit sectors (Preston, 1989; 
Holtmann and Idson, 1993) but none has brough them together. Second, although 
there is a little research on nonprofit workers compensation in the United States, 
there is almost none in other countries, especially in France.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly presents the 
Preston’s labor donation model. Section 3 outlines the empirical model used that 
explicitly addresses the endogeneity bias that may arise through the simultaneity of 
sector choice and wages. The empirical results are presented in section 5. Finally, 
section 6 offers concluding comments.
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3. Labor donation model
The labor donation model has been formalized by Preston (1989). She 
postulates that all productive organizations produce a good that generates private and 
social benefits. The latter are defined as “social externalities, benefits enjoyed by 
parties external to the transaction or, more specifically, by society as a whole” and 
have a flavour of public goods. 
The utility of each worker is assumed to be positively related to his labor 
income and the extent of the social benefits ( SB ) generated by his employer: 
),( SBwUU ii = (1)
with  0  0w SBU and U> >
Along the indifference curve, all workers are then ready to substitute social 
benefits to his wage:
0w U
SB


<
(2)
Workers are likely to donate labor, exchange wages against social benefits. In 
the literature, the labor donation theory has only been tested by estimating the wage 
differential between nonprofit and for-profit sectors. Indeed, nonprofit organizations 
are hypothesized to produce more social benefits by nature than for-profit firms 
because they are more present in sectors like education, health and social services. 
Consequently, nonprofit organizations will be able to attract the workers with the 
highest rate of substitution between wages and social benefits by paying lower 
wages. After self-selection of the workers in their preferred sector, the wage 
differential between nonprofit and for-profit sectors should be negative. However, 
the labor donation theory has never been empirically tested by considering public 
sector in addition to these two sectors.
According to François and Vlassopoulos (2007), the workers’ inclination to 
donate labor is related to the way the organization in which they work takes 
advantage on their donated contribution. Indeed, the workers care about the value of 
the good and service to which they contribute. In this sense, nonprofit organizations 
may have a distinct advantage from public and for-profit organizations in generating 
social benefits. At first, contrary to for-profit counterparts, the nonprofit and public 
employees do not fear that their “labor donations” are expropriated by a residual 
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claimant to raise profits. Next, the managers of nonprofit firms have more flexibility 
than government bureaucrats “in choosing the mission and provided services tailored 
to the needs of the local community” (François and Vlassopoulos, 2007). In fact, 
they are appointed by the community whereas government bureaucrats obey elected 
politicians and, as a result, might take actions that encourage the likelihood of re-
election. In the end, we can hypothesize that nonprofit workers may accept to earn 
less than the would earn in for-profit and nonprofit sectors. The study of wage 
differentials between these three sectors may therefore allow us to explore this 
hypothesis.
Contrary to the labor donation theory, there are other theoretical reasons to 
expect that nonprofit organizations pay higher wages to comparable workers than 
their for-profit counterparts. According to the theory of property rights, nonprofit 
organizations will be less prone to minimize costs than for-profit organizations 
because of nondistribution constraint. In this case, the relatively high wages observed 
in nonprofit sector represent rent-sharing due to attenuated property rights. Another 
rational for wages to be higher in the nonprofit sector can be found in the efficiency 
wage theory. Under the assumption that performance is more difficult to control in 
nonprofit organizations than in for-profit organizations, the efficiency wage 
hypothesis argues that this problem may be partially resolved by a wage in excess.
3. Multinomial logit selection model
The model used to estimate the wage differentials between the different sectors 
is a multinomial logit selection model3. This model permits us to deal with two 
distinct problems. First, separated wage equations are estimated for each sector 
which allows for the possibility that each worker faces an entirely different wage 
determination process according to his selected sector. Second, some workers may 
decide on their sector of employment because of the wage differential while others 
simply prefer to work in nonprofit organizations for nonwage aspects of the job in 
accordance with the labor donation theory. The wage equations must be estimatied in 
3
 This empirical model has been notably used by Gyourko and Tracy (1988) to analyse union wage 
differentials in the public and private sectors, while controlling for sample selection.
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way that accounts for selectivity. In other words, we allow for endogenous selection 
into sectors.
The multinomial logit selection model can be described as follows. Each 
worker is assumed to face three mutually exclusive choices: working in the for-profit 
sector )( fpj = , working in the nonprofit sector )( npj =  and working in the public 
sector )( puj = . The ‘potential’ hourly wage for the ith worker in the jth sector is 
given by
i,ji'ji,j XWln  += (3)
where  iX  is a vector of job and worker characteristics that affect the log hourly 
wage ( ijW ,ln ) and ij,  ),0( 2jN 	 .
However, sector’s choice is not exogenous. In fact, individuals are assumed to 
select the sector that maximizes expected utility. According to the labor donation 
theory (Preston, 1989), the maximum utility attainable given each sector will be a 
function of the log hourly wage ( ijW ,ln ) and social benefits ( jSB ) offer by each 
sector. The ith individual’s expected utility from working in sector j is modelled by 
the index function
ijijij ZI ,
*
,
' 
 += (4)
iZ  includes all the variables that may d termine the log hourly wage ( iX ) plus 
additional variables that reflect the individual’s preferences for the sectors and more 
precisely for social benefits offered by the sectors. The ith individual then compares 
ijI ,  for all pufpnpj ,,=  and chooses that sector for which ijI ,  is a maximum. This 
optimization process is captured by the sector indicator function:
*
,
*
,
max ikjkiji
IIiffjI

>= (5)
Following the formulation in Lee (1983), we define the following residual for each 
individual and each sector:
ijikjkij
Iu
,
*
,,
max 
=

(6)
From (5), (6) and (7), we obtain a reformulation of the sector indicator function:
ijiji ZussijI ', <= (7)
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Then, as shown by Domencich and McFadden (1975), the probability that the sector 
s will be chosen is given by4
)(Prob)Prob '
, ijiji Zuj(I <==

=
= 3
1
'
'
)exp(
)exp(
k
ik
ij
Z
Z


(8)
The worker’s choice of sectors is then analysed with a multinomial logit model. We 
estimate the wage equation in each sector using the generalized two-step procedure 
presented in Lee (1983):
)()(ln
,
'
,
jIEXjIWE iijijiij =+== 
)( '
,,
'
ijijijij ZuEX  <+=
[ ]{ }
)(
)(
'
'1
'
ijj
ijj
jjij
ZF
ZF
X


	

=
ijjjij X ,
' 	 =
(9)
Where F denotes the multinomial logit distribution function. (.)  and (.)  are the 
standard normal distribution and density functions respectively. j  is the correlation 
coefficient between i,j
  and i,j . j	  is the standard deviation of the error term ij , . 
ij ,  represents the selection term. 
The model is estimated in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the 
multinomial logit model (4) by the logit maximum likelihood method to obtain jˆ . 
In the second step, we estimate equation (9) by ordinary least squares (OLS) after  
substituting jˆ  for jˆ
5
.
4
 The disturbances ij,
  are assumed to be independently and identically distributed with the type I 
extreme value distribution with cumulative distribution function given by 
[ ])exp(exp)(
,
xxF ij =<
 .
5
 The corrected variance-covariance matrix has been derived following the method presented in Lee, 
Maddala and Trost (1980).
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Estimation of the multinomial logit model in the first step is based on the 
assumption that probabilities of the alternative choices are independent of each other. 
In other words, removing any of the alternatives in the model should not alter the 
relative probabilities of choosing the remaining alternatives. This is commonly 
known as the property of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Available 
tests for IIA start from the premise that if a subset of choices is truly irrelevant, 
omitting them from the model will not change the estimates using the remaining 
choices systematically. We have chosen to use Small and Hsiao (1985) test for the 
IIA assumption. Table 1 displays the results concerning this test using specification 
of equation (4) described in the next section. It appears that the IIA assumption holds 
in all cases. In other words, adding or deleting choices does not affect the odds 
among the remaining choices, and the multinomial logit is the correct model choice.
4. Description of data and variables
The data used in this study were taken from the 1994-2001 French Labor Force 
Survey conducted by INSEE6. This survey has the advantage of specifically 
identifying the nonprofit status of worker.
The sample has been selected to include all employees between the ages of 16 
and 65 with a permanent contract. Moreover, we have restricted our attention to 
services sector because nonprofit organizations only move in this sector. In the sector 
of services, our analysis is also limited to sub-sectors in which the three institutional 
forms – nonprofit, for-profit and public – coexist7. The rationale for the last selection 
criterion is that we wish to consider homogeneous production techniques and 
hopefully similar types of jobs. Finally, the working sample consists of 97 010 
observations. Of these, 11 748 refer to individuals in the nonprofit sector, 25 030 in 
the for-profit sector and 60 232 in the public sector.
In the wage equations, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly 
net wage on the main job. Hourly net wage is calculated as net earnings in the last 
month (with the exception of special specific wage premia) divided by 4.33 
6
 INSEE is the French National Institute for Statistics and Economics Studies.
7
 For example, we have excluded sub-sectors like « Transport, storage and communications » and 
« Financial intermediation » where nonprofit organizations are almost inactive.
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9
multiplied by the usual weekly working hours. Nominal values are converted into 
real terms with a base period of 1990. The explanatory variables assumed to 
influence wages include sex, marital status, number of children, age, dummy 
variables for education, tenure at current job8, dummy variable indicating if 
individuals work part-time, occupation, size of firm measured by the number of 
employees, dummy variable signalling if individuals are employed in the Paris Area, 
and some working conditions.
The variables included in the choice of the sector equation are the explanatory 
variables of the potential log hourly net wage9. Moreover, to achieve identification of 
the selection model, it is necessary to include additional variables, called 
“instruments”, that influence sector choice but have no direct effects on wages (i.e., 
variables in Z which are not in X). Many instruments are suggested.
According to Weisbrod (1983), socioeconomic backgrounds are hypothesized 
to influence sector’s choice. We use the father’s occupation as a proxy of 
socioeconomic backgrounds. We include two dummy variables. The first signals if 
the worker has a father who works in the public sector. The second indicates if the 
worker has a father who holds an occupation in the private sector (nonprofit or for-
profit) rather directed to social welfare improvement. We expect that the latter 
variable will positively influence the probability of selecting nonprofit sector.
We also create two variables indicating the proportion of nonprofit employment 
and the proportion of public employment in the services sector total employment 
when the worker has been hired in his current job. The idea is that, according to their 
year of hire, workers may have greater access to nonprofit and public sectors and 
presumably lower cost of entry.
Finally, we include a dummy variable measuring if the organization offers non-
monthly wage premia. The idea is that nonprofit workers, because of their 
preferences for social benefits, are less attracted to this kind of reward than their for-
profit and public counterparts.
Table 2 offers summary descriptive statistics of the sample by sector. It shows 
many significant differences between sectors. For example, public workers earn on 
average 2.7 per cent more than nonprofit workers who, in turn, earn on average 1.9 
8
 Tenure is obtained as the difference between the year of the survey and the year of the start of the 
current job.
9
 However, job tenure is not considered in the choice of the sector equation because selection must 
precede tenure at current job.
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per cent more than for-profit workers. There are more part-time workers and female 
employees in nonprofit sector than in other sectors. Compared to for-profit workers, 
nonprofit and public workers are older, much more highly educated and have higher 
job tenure.
5. Empirical results
5.1 Choice equation
The marginal effect of each variable on the probability of selecting each sector 
is given in table 3. Several features are worth noting about these effects. As can be 
seen in the bottom of table 3, the variables not used in the wage equations have the 
expected signs. The proportion of nonprofit (respectively public) employment in the 
services sector total employment influences positively and significantly the 
probability of selecting the nonprofit (respectively public) sector. Having a father 
who works in the public (nonprofit) sector is associated with a significantly greater 
probability of being employed in the public (nonprofit) sector. Other things equal, 
nonprofit workers are less likely to be attracted by non-monthly wage premia 
(variable “bonus”) compared to their for-profit and public counterparts. This result 
means that nonprofit organizations attract workers who have lower interest in 
monetary rewards in accordance with labor donation theory.
The results for the explanatory variables used in the wage equations also merit 
some remarks. Being employed part-time increases the probability of selecting the 
nonprofit sector. Youngers are more likely to be for-profit workers. Considering the 
level of education, estimates show that education significantly increases the 
individual’s likelihood of being employed in the public sector. Managers have a 
higher probability of selecting the nonprofit sector while being technicians or 
employees reduces the likelihood of being in the for_profit sector.
Using the estimation procedure presented in section 3, the results from table 3 
(the coefficients but not the marginal effects) are used to estimate the wage equations 
with selectivity correction.
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5.2 Wage equations
The estimation results for the selectivity-corrected wage equations are 
presented in table 4. Selection terms are statistically significant for the three sectors. 
The sectors’ choice is then endogenous. A negative (positive) estimated coefficient 
on selection term implies that workers who choose the considered sector have 
unobserved characteristics which lead them to earn more (less) than a person 
randomly drawn from the population and assigned to this sector.
The human capital variables have the expected signs in the three sectors. Age 
and job tenure imply the familiar inverted-U shaped wage profile. Returns to 
education are similarly positively significant. Female workers, compared to male 
workers, receive lower wages. Variables like the number of children, or being 
married, have also a positive impact on wages. The same is true for characteristics 
like working in the Paris area or in a large firm that imply higher wages.
5.3 Wage differentials
Unconditional wage differentials between nonprofit, for-profit and public 
sectors are presented in figure 1 and are estimated as follows10:
1001
)ˆexp(
)ˆexp(
1001)(ln
)(ln
×








=×








= 
ii
ij
ij
ij
ji X
X
XWE
XWE
W


(11)
jiW   compares on average what the workers of sector i would have earned if 
they had to work in sector j with what they earn in sector i. For example, the first 
wage differential presented in figure 1 ( fppuW  =+2.4%) compares on average what 
the public workers ( pui = ) would have earned if they had to work in for-profit 
sector ( fpj = ) with what they earn in public sector.
The two wage differentials in the bottom of figure 1 support the Preston’s 
theoretical model of section 2 which predicts that nonprofit workers may be willing 
to work at lower wage than they could have obtained elsewhere. In fact, they would 
have earned 21.1% and 27.3% more if they had to work in public sector and for-
10
 In a selection model involving more than two choices, the conditional wage differentials (defined as 
the difference between a worker’s expected wage in his preferred sector and his expected wage in his 
less preferred sector) cannot be estimated because some of the covariance terms required are not 
identified (see, Gyourko et Tracy, 1988, pp. 240-241).
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profit sector respectively. In contrast, for-profit workers have chosen the best 
profitable sector. Considering the public workers, they would have obtained a 
supplementary wage benefit of 2.4% in joining the for-profit sector and a wage 
penalty of 21.5% in joining the nonprofit sector. These results also suggest that 
nonprofit sector is considered by nonprofit workers as the best provider of social 
benefits.
6. Conclusion
Our aim in this paper was to examine the wage differentials between French 
nonprofit, for-profit and public sectors in order to test the Preston’s labor donation 
theory. Our results support this theory more extensively than previous American 
studies which have overlooked the public sector.
The nonprofit sector attracts workers who have a strong commitment to the 
social objective of the nonprofit organizations and a subordinate interest in monetary 
gains. Therefore, nonprofit reports may report higher levels of intrinsic motivation 
than for-profit and public counterparts. Based on the Motivation Crowding-out 
Theory (Frey, 1997), we argue that nonprofit employers must adopt an approach to 
human resource management aimed at maintaining the intrinsic motivation of their 
employees.
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Table 1 - Small-Hsiao test of the IIA assumption
Sector omitted lnL[full] lnL[omit] SH P>chi2 Evidence
For-profit sector -1,03E+4 -1,03E+4 36,642 0,347 for H0
Nonprofit sector -1,67E+4 -1,67E+4 28,169 0,749 for H0
Public sector -7561,21 -7538,78 44,856 0,101 for H0
Source : INSEE, French Labor Force Survey (1994 to 2001)
Note : The basic idea of the Small and Hsiao (1985) test is that if the IIA assumption holds, the log-
likelihood for the unrestricted model (lnL[full]) will not be very different from the log-likelihood for 
the restricted model (lnL[omit]). This latter model is created by dropping one choice alternative.
The hypotheses are:
H0: IIA assumption is not violated.
H1: IIA assumption is violated.
The test statistics is:
SH=-2[lnL[full]-lnL[omit]]
SH is asymptotically chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
independent variables plus one.
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics
Variable Nonprofit 
sector
For-profit 
sector
Public 
sector
Log net hourly wage
(in 1990 French Francs)
3.70
(0.32)
3.63
(0.33)
3.80
(0.32)
Part-time work (%) 21.6 15.8 12.1
Female (%) 71.7 63.2 64.2
Married or cohabiting (%) 73.6 71.5 75.6
Number of children 0.8
(1.0)
0.8
(1.0)
0.8
(1.0)
Age (years) 40.8
(9.6)
37.3
(9.8)
41.6
(9.3)
Job tenure (years) 9.5
(7.9)
7.6
(7.8)
13.3
(9.6)
Qualifications (%) :
No qualification 20.8 20.7 19.6
General lower secondary 6.6 8.0 7.2
Vocational lower secondary 26.1 30.1 26.3
High school degree 13.3 16.1 13.3
Undergraduate level 21.9 16.2 19.1
Above undergraduate 11.3 8.9 14.5
Occupations (%) :
Blue-collar 10.5 17.4 11.1
Employee 42.8 46.6 43.1
Technicians, supervisors 36.7 24.7 32.2
Managers 10.0 11.3 13.6
Firm sizes (%) :
1-9 25.4 37.7 37.2
10-49 23.7 22.7 9.8
50-499 32.1 22.1 21.0
>499 18.8 17.5 32.0
Employed in the Paris area (%) 12.4 22.0 12.6
Working conditions (%) :
Night work 10.7 14.1 13.84
Shift work 7.4 6.3 8.30
Sunday work 32.0 31.4 36.03
Variable working time 30.5 28.2 26.43
Nonprofit employment (%) 8.5 8.8 7.6
Public employment (%) 39.1 36.1 44.8
Father’s occupation (%) :
Public sector 14.2 13.0 17.9
Nonprofit sector (approximation) 34.8 30.1 32.1
Bonus (%) 35.9 46.9 51.4
N 11 748 25 030 60 232
Source : INSEE, French Labor Force Survey (1994 to 2001)
Note : Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3 – Multinomial logit sector choice model (marginal effects)
Variable Nonprofit sector For-profit sector Public sector
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Intercept -0.505 (23.18) 0.696 (23.63) -0.191 (5.58)
Part-time work 0.032 (11.46) -0.018 (5.94) -0.006* (1.29)
Female 0.023 (9.42) 0.014 (4.10) -0.037 (9.54)
Married or cohabiting 0.001* (0.26) 0.011 (3.11) -0.011 (2.86)
Number of children -0.005 (4.19) -0.009 (5.52) 0.014 (7.45)
Age 0.004 (4.68) -0.019 (15.05) 0.015 (9.95)
Age2/100 -0.003 (2.63) 0.020 (12.49) -0.017 (9.17)
Qualifications :
No qualification Ref. Ref. Ref.
General lower 
secondary
-0.002* (0.42) 0.016 (2.70) -0.014 (2.04)
Vocational lower 
secondary
0.009 (2.91) 0.007* (1.80) -0.016 (3.37)
High school degree -0.001* (0.42) 0.008* (1.48) -0.008* (1.24)
Undergraduate level 0.006* (1.63) -0.050 (8.74) 0.044 (6.67)
Above 
undergraduate
-0.014 (2.92) -0.181 (24.71) 0.195 (23.84)
Occupations:
Blue-collar Ref. Ref. Ref.
Employee 0.013 (3.63) -0.072 (15.60) 0.059 (10.55)
Technicians, 
supervisors
0.053 (12.83) -0.084 (15.29) 0.030 (4.70)
Managers 0.022 (3.95) -0.003* (0.37) -0.019 (2.24)
Firm sizes :
1-9 Ref. Ref. Ref.
10-49 0.103 (35.70) 0.099 (24.08) -0.202 (42.21)
50-499 0.087 (33.09) -0.018 (4.77) -0.069 (15.97)
>499 0.020* (6.62) -0.113 (28.05) 0.092 (20.50)
Employed in the Paris 
area
-0.009 (2.84) 0.133 (35.41) -0.124 (27.12)
Working conditions :
Night work -0.020 (5.65) 0.039 (8.28) 0.019 (3.50)
Shift work 0.023 (5.46) -0.020 (3.34) -0.002* (0.37)
Sunday work -0.012 (4.95) -0.040 (11.04) 0.052 (12.78)
Variable working 
time
0.025 (10.74) 0.030 (8.76) -0.055 (14.12)
Nonprofit employment 0.020 (19.62) -0.002* (1.60) -0.018 (11.02)
Public employment 0.002 (2.93) -0.007 (32.04) 0.007 (26.46)
Father’s occupation :
Public sector -0.011 (3.70) -0.062 (14.66) 0.073 (15.39)
Nonprofit sector 0.009 (3.75) -0.017 (5.45) 0.009 (2.48)
Bonus -0.055 (25.54) 0.036 (12.06) 0.018 (5.37)
Log likelihood -77 959.75
N 97 010
Source : INSEE, French Labor Force Survey (1994 to 2001)
Note: The specification includes as set of year dummies. Absolute t-values are in parentheses. * not 
significant at 5%. 
Page 17 of 47
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
18
Table 4 – Wage equations estimates with selectivity correction by sector of 
employment
Variables Nonprofit sector For-profit sector Public sector
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Intercept 2.548 (87.12) 2.778 (92.80) 2.959 (95.67)
Part-time work 0.006* (0.11) -0.019* (0.81) -0.020* (0.78)
Female -0.064 (6.99) -0.068 (11.81) -0.061 (17.68)
Married or cohabiting 0.023 (4.23) 0.011 (3.44) 0.018 (9.17)
Number of children 0.008* (1.70) 0.013 (3.97) 0.019 (9.87)
Age 0.020 (6.44) 0.025 (12.48) 0.015 (9.75)
Age2/100 -0.018 (8.06) -0.025 (15.37) -0.013 (12.83)
Job tenure 0.012 (5.11) 0.014 (8.66) 0.012 (13.51)
Job tenure2/100 -0.012 (13.75) -0.007 (9.92) -0.009 (20.33)
Qualifications :
No qualification Ref. Ref. Ref.
General lower 
secondary
0.124 (20.41) 0.068 (17.11) 0.095 (39.61)
Vocational lower 
secondary
0.155 (20.01) 0.082 (16.90) 0.087 (28.20)
High school degree 0.219 (28.67) 0.138 (24.90) 0.160 (47.46)
Undergraduate level 0.294 (31.02) 0.224 (23.20) 0.229 (45.22)
Above 
undergraduate
0.304 (51.61) 0.290 (68.72) 0.276 (97.90)
Occupations:
Blue-collar Ref. Ref. Ref.
Employee 0.069 (7.71) 0.047 (8.17) 0.027 (7.78)
Technicians, 
supervisors
0.270 (25.11) 0.225 (34.83) 0.223 (50.67)
Managers 0.393 (36.45) 0.403 (62.59) 0.367 (83.58)
Firm sizes :
1-9 Ref. Ref. Ref.
10-49 0.070 (9.13) 0.007* (1.47) -0.012 (3.92)
50-499 0.084 (10.15) 0.038 (7.97) 0.007* (1.43)
>499 0.093 (11.54) 0.070 (18.13) 0.020 (24.28)
Employed in the Paris 
area
0.092 (12.75) 0.101 (21.83) 0.061 (7.79)
Working conditions :
Night work 0.030 (3.66) 0.009* (1.56) 0.049 (15.39)
Shift work 0.044 (8.78) 0.016 (4.05) 0.032 (14.77)
Sunday work 0.030 (6.11) 0.003* (1.01) 0.043 (20.18)
Variable working 
time
-0.012* (1.66) -0.017 (2.93) 0.010 (3.85)
Selection term -0.087 (6.19) 0.099 (15.60) 0.044 (3.72)
R2 0.56 0.60 0.65
N 11 748 25 030 60 232
Source : INSEE, French Labor Force Survey (1994 to 2001)
Note: The specification includes a set of industry and year dummies. Absolute t-values are in 
parentheses. * not significant at 5%. 
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Figure 1 - What the workers would have earned if they had to work in an 
another sector
Nonprofit sector
Public sector
For-profit sector
Public workers
For-profit workers
Nonprofit workers
+2.4%
-21.5%
-4.5%
-22.9%
+21.1%
+27.3%
Note : All the differentials are significant at 5% level.
Lecture : The public workers would have earned 2.4% more if they had to work in nonprofit sector.
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Would nonprofit workers accept to earn less? Evidence 
from France
Mathieu NARCY
CEE, ERMES and TEPP (FR n°3126, CNRS)
CEE – “Le Descartes I”, 29 promenade Michel Simon, 93166 Noisy Le Grand, France.
Tel : +33 (0)1 45 92 69 58 – Email : mathieu.narcy@cee.enpc.fr
Abstract
This paper focuses on wage differentials between French nonprofit, for-profit and 
public sectors. Considering the public sector allows testing more extensively the 
labour donation theory (Preston, 1989). The findings support this theory because 
nonprofit workers accept to earn significantly less than they would earn in the for-
profit and public sectors. They also suggest differences in the motivations of workers 
in these sectors. Nonprofit workers are attracted to their work for reasons 
transcending material compensation.
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1. Introduction
The nonprofit sector constitutes a significant and expanding segment of the 
French economy. Today, it generates around 3.2% of the gross national product. It is 
also a large employer with a total of more than one million full-time equivalent paid 
workers, a share of 5% of the total salaries in all industries1. This total employment 
increased by 19.4% between 1999 and 2005. Although the nonprofit employment is 
very important in France, very little attention has been paid to the compensation of 
nonprofit workers. This paper aims to fill this gap.
Nonprofit organizations are characterized by the “nondistribution constraint”, 
i.e. the prohibition to distribute profits to those who are in charge of the organization 
(Hansman, 1980). Moreover, their objectives are to produce goods and services that 
generate social benefits and/or to insure the consumer to receive high quality 
products and services in markets characterized by informational asymmetries. In fact, 
nonprofit organizations often dominate human and social services aspects of our 
economy. These characteristics of nonprofit sector are assumed to have effect on the 
labour market. Wages paid in nonprofit organizations should vary from those paid in 
comparable for-profit and public organizations.
Labour donation theory (Preston, 1989) postulates that both the moral and 
ethical goals of nonprofit organizations and the nature of their goods and services 
aimed at generating social benefits will attract workers who have a lower interest in 
monetary rewards. Consequently, they may be willing to work at nonprofit 
organizations at a lower wage than they could have obtained in for-profit 
organizations because they derive a compensating utility from assisting with 
production in which they find social value. Nonprofit workers may then report higher 
levels of pro-social motivation and importance of work relative to money in their 
occupations than for-profit counterparts. This motivation is similar to an intrinsic 
motivation in the sense it doesn’t stem from the pecuniary or other material rewards 
that a worker may receive from outside (François and Vlassopoulos, 2007).
1
 Nonprofit organizations are also an important part of the American economy. In 1995, there were 9.6 
million full-time equivalent paid workers in nonprofit sector and nonprofit employment accounted for 
8.8% of the gross national product (see Salamon et al., 1999).
Page 21 of 47
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
3
Many American studies estimated the wage differential between the nonprofit 
and for-profit sectors in order to test the labour donation theory2. These studies 
obtained equivocal results. Some of them support Preston’s theory while others do 
not. Among these studies, few addressed self-selection of workers into sector 
although selectivity bias may account for a portion of the wage differential. 
Moreover, all these studies assumed that each worker only faces two choices –
working in the nonprofit sector or working in the for-profit sector – and disregarded 
the possibility that workers may decide to be employed in the public sector.
This paper focuses on wage differentials between nonprofit, for-profit and 
public sectors while allowing for the endogeneity of sector choice. Using the French 
Labour Force Survey over the 1994-2001 period, a multinomial logit selection model 
is estimated. This research is original for at least three reasons. 
First, although there is a little research on nonprofit workers compensation in 
the United States, there is almost none in other countries, especially in France.
Second, to the best our knowledge, it is the first to estimate the wage 
differentials between these three sectors while correcting selection bias. Some studies 
have analyzed the selectivity-corrected wage differential between public and for-
profit sectors (see, for example, Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Dustmann and Van 
Soest, 1998; Prescott and Wandschneider, 1999) and others between nonprofit and 
for-profit sectors (Preston, 1989; Holtmann and Idson, 1993; Nogushi, Shimizutani 
and Suzuki, 2008) but none has brough them together. Considering the nonprofit, 
for-profit and public sectors is useful because it allows testing more extensively the 
labour donation theory. In fact, nonprofit workers really “donate labour” to their 
employers by accepting reduced compensation if they earn less in the nonprofit 
sector than they would earn not only in the for-profit sector but also in the public 
sector.
Third, very little is known about the pay differential between public and 
nonprofit sectors in France and in other countries. This paper also aims to fill this 
gap. While public and nonprofit sectors differ from for-profit one in several 
dimensions through which wage setting may be affected, the differences between 
public and nonprofit sectors are less clear. More particularly, like nonprofit firms, 
public organizations may also receive labour donations because they produce output 
2 See, for example, Preston (1989), Holtmann and Idson (1993), Hallock (2000), Ruhm and Borkoski 
(2003), Mocan and Teikin (2003).
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that is socially valued. The estimation of wage differential between nonprofit and 
public sectors may shed new light on differences in pro-social motivation of workers 
in these two sectors.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the different 
theoretical explications for the existence of wage differentials between nonprofit, for-
profit and public sectors and, more particularly, the Preston’s labour donation model. 
Section 3 outlines the empirical model used that explicitly addresses the endogeneity 
bias that may arise through the simultaneity of sector choice and wages. The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 offers 
concluding comments.
2. Theoretical explanations for the existence of wage differentials between 
institutional forms
In this section, we provide an overview of the theories that have been proposed 
in the literature to explain the existence of wage differentials between nonprofit, for-
profit and public sectors. First, we focus on the labour donation theory (Preston, 
1989) because it suggests differences in pro-social motivation of workers in these 
three sectors. While this theory has been typically developed to explain the wage 
differential between nonprofit and for-profit sectors, we argue that it can be extended 
in order to analyze, not only the public-for-profit wage differential, but also the 
public/nonprofit wage differential. Second, we briefly discuss the other theories that 
can also explain the existence of wage differentials between nonprofit, for-profit and 
public sectors.
2. 1. Labour donation model
The labour donation model has been formalized by Preston (1989). She 
postulates that all productive organizations produce a good that generates private and 
social benefits. The latter are defined as “social externalities, benefits enjoyed by 
parties external to the transaction or, more specifically, by society as a whole” and 
have a flavour of public goods. 
Page 23 of 47
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
5
The utility of each worker is assumed to be positively related to his labour 
income and the extent of the social benefits ( SB ) generated by his employer: 
),( SBwUU ii = (1)
with  0  0w SBU and U> >
Along the indifference curve, all workers are then ready to substitute social 
benefits to his wage:
0w U
SB


<
(2)
Workers are likely to donate labour, exchange wages against social benefits. In 
the literature, the labour donation theory has only been tested by estimating the wage 
differential between nonprofit and for-profit sectors. Indeed, nonprofit organizations 
are hypothesized to produce more social benefits by nature than for-profit firms 
because they are more present in sectors like education, health and social services. 
Consequently, nonprofit organizations will be able to attract the workers with the 
highest rate of substitution between wages and social benefits by paying lower 
wages. After self-selection of the workers in their preferred sector, the wage 
differential between nonprofit and for-profit sectors should be negative and could 
signal a greater pro-social motivation among nonprofit workers than among their for-
profit counterparts. The labour donation theory has never been empirically tested by 
considering public sector in addition to these two sectors. However, this theory can 
be extended to predict on the one hand the public/for-profit wage differential and, on 
the other hand, the nonprofit-public wage differential.
According to François and Vlassopoulos (2007), the workers’ inclination to 
donate labour is related to not only the quantity of social benefits produced by the 
organization but also the way the organization in which they work takes advantage 
on their donated contribution. In this sense, nonprofit and public organizations may 
have a distinct advantage from for-profit organizations.
First, these two institutional forms are hypothesized to produce output more 
socially valued compared to the for-profit form. 
Second, contrary to for-profit counterparts, the nonprofit and public employees 
do not fear that their “labour donations” are expropriated by a residual claimant to 
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6
raise profits3. This happens because for-profit organizations are unable to credibly 
ensure that labour donations will not be utilized to enhance profit instead of output. 
Consequently, like the wage differential between nonprofit and for-profit sectors, the 
wage differential between public and for-profit sectors should be also negative.
At a theoretical level, the difference between public and nonprofit sectors as 
providers of social services is not well understood. However, we argue that socially 
motivated workers may be more prone to donate labour in nonprofit organizations 
than in public ones. Two main reasons may explain this workers’ inclination.
First, if we refer to the ‘public goods’ theory developed by Weisbrod (1988), 
we can hypothesize that nonprofit sector may provide more social benefits than is 
possible in the public sector. According to this theory, nonprofit organizations arise 
to provide collective goods to people that exhibits preferences other than those of the 
median voter whereas government provides collective goods in order to meet the 
needs of the median voter. Hence, nonprofit organizations represent a mechanism to 
satisfy people who are dissatisfied with the level or quality of some collective goods 
and services produced by the public sector. Then, nonprofits seem to be better 
positioned than public organizations to support excluded groups as disabled, 
unemployed and so on. Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (1996) argues that, compared to 
nonprofits, “government agencies are usually too constrained by legislative mandates 
and demands for uniformity” (p. 717).
Second, according to François and Vlassopoulos (2007), nonprofits are less 
encouraged than government to take advantage on the labour donations of their 
workers. In fact, the managers of nonprofit firms have more flexibility than 
government bureaucrats “in choosing the mission and provided services tailored to 
the needs of the local community”. In fact, they are appointed by the community 
whereas government bureaucrats obey elected politicians and, as a result, might take 
actions that encourage the likelihood of re-election. In the end, we can hypothesize 
that nonprofit workers may accept to earn less than they would earn in for-profit and 
public sectors. The study of wage differentials between these three sectors may 
therefore allow us to explore these different hypotheses.
3
 While public sector is not legally subject to same nondistribution constraint as is nonprofit sector, it 
is subject to political and legal constraints that also effectively prohibit public organizations from 
distributing their profits.
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2.2. Other theoretical explanations
There exist other possible explanations for the observed differences in pay 
between public and for-profit sectors. 
The public sector is subject to political constraints and not to profit constraints. 
The political system may have different objectives from those of the for-profit sector 
and may lead to higher wages in the public sector. In fact, public workers do not only 
produce goods and services but also engage in vote-producing activities. A well-paid 
workforce can be then in the interest of the politicians (Gunderson, 1979). To justify 
a higher pay in the public organizations than in the for-profit ones, a larger influence 
of trade unions in the public sector is also often invoked (Gregory and Borland, 
1999).
Another argument concerns the potential existence of compensating wage 
differentials. According to this argument, wages for similar employees in comparable 
jobs should be lower in the public sector than in the for-profit one. In fact, public 
workers benefit from job protection and may enjoy fringe benefits such as longer 
holidays or more advantageous pensions plans. Since fringe benefits and the risk 
aversion of workers are rarely observed in empirical studies, they may lead to a for-
profit wage premium which is a compensation for the lack of fringe benefits and/or 
job security (Bellante and Link, 1981; Gregory and Borland, 1999). However, 
Panizza (1999) discusses an alternative view in which higher job security could 
rather lead to public sector wage premium. In fact, job security undermines the 
incentive to work hard and forces the public sector to pay higher wages in an 
efficiency wage setting.
Contrary to the labour donation theory, there are other theoretical reasons to 
expect that nonprofit organizations pay higher wages to comparable workers than 
their for-profit counterparts. According to the theory of property rights, nonprofit 
organizations will be less prone to minimize costs than for-profit organizations 
because of nondistribution constraint (Borjas et al., 1983). In this case, the relatively 
high wages observed in nonprofit sector represent rent-sharing due to attenuated 
property rights. Another rational for wages to be higher in the nonprofit sector can be 
found in the efficiency wage theory. Efficiency wages may be more prevalent in the 
nonprofit sector because of the nature of the output in the sector and the difficulty of 
monitoring nonprofit worker effort.
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3. Multinomial logit selection model
The model used to estimate the wage differentials between the different sectors 
is a multinomial logit selection model4. This model permits us to deal with two 
distinct problems. First, separated wage equations are estimated for each sector 
which allows for the possibility that each worker faces an entirely different wage 
determination process according to his selected sector. Second, some workers may 
decide on their sector of employment because of the wage differential while others 
simply prefer to work in nonprofit organizations for nonwage aspects of the job in 
accordance with the labour donation theory. The wage equations must be estimatied 
in way that accounts for selectivity. In other words, we allow for endogenous 
selection into sectors.
The multinomial logit selection model can be described as follows. Each 
worker is assumed to face three mutually exclusive choices: working in the for-profit 
sector )( fpj = , working in the nonprofit sector )( npj =  and working in the public 
sector )( puj = . The ‘potential’ hourly wage for the ith worker in the jth sector is 
given by
i,ji'ji,j XWln  += (3)
where  iX  is a vector of job and worker characteristics that affect the log hourly 
wage ( ijW ,ln ) and ij,  ),0( 2jN 	 .
However, sector’s choice is not exogenous. In fact, individuals are assumed to 
select the sector that maximizes expected utility. According to the labour donation 
theory (Preston, 1989), the maximum utility attainable given each sector will be a 
function of the log hourly wage ( ijW ,ln ) and social benefits ( jSB ) offer by each 
sector. The ith individual’s expected utility from working in sector j is modelled by 
the index function
ijijij ZI ,
*
,
' 
 += (4)
iZ  includes all the variables that may determine the log hourly wage ( iX ) plus 
additional variables that reflect the individual’s preferences for the sectors and more 
4
 This empirical model has been notably used by Gyourko and Tracy (1988) to analyse union wage 
differentials in the public and private sectors, while controlling for sample selection.
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9
precisely for social benefits offered by the sectors. The ith individual then compares 
ijI ,  for all pufpnpj ,,=  and chooses that sector for which ijI ,  is a maximum. This 
optimization process is captured by the sector indicator function:
*
,
*
,
max ikjkiji
IIiffjI

>= (5)
Following the formulation in Lee (1983), we define the following residual for each 
individual and each sector:
ijikjkij
Iu
,
*
,,
max 
=

(6)
From (5), (6) and (7), we obtain a reformulation of the sector indicator function:
ijiji ZussijI ', <= (7)
Then, as shown by Domencich and McFadden (1975), the probability that the sector 
s will be chosen is given by5
)(Prob)Prob '
, ijiji Zuj(I <==

=
= 3
1
'
'
)exp(
)exp(
k
ik
ij
Z
Z


(8)
The worker’s choice of sectors is then analysed with a multinomial logit model. We 
estimate the wage equation in each sector using the generalized two-step procedure 
presented in Lee (1983):
)()(ln
,
'
,
jIEXjIWE iijijiij =+== 
)( '
,,
'
ijijijij ZuEX  <+=
[ ]{ }
)(
)(
'
'1
'
ijj
ijj
jjij
ZF
ZF
X


	

=
ijjjij X ,
' 	 =
(9)
5
 The disturbances ij,
  are assumed to be independently and identically distributed with the type I 
extreme value distribution with cumulative distribution function given by 
[ ])exp(exp)(
,
xxF ij =<
 .
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Where F denotes the multinomial logit distribution function. (.)  and (.)  are the 
standard normal distribution and density functions respectively. j  is the correlation 
coefficient between i,j
  and i,j . j	  is the standard deviation of the error term ij , . 
ij ,  represents the selection term. 
The model is estimated in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the 
multinomial logit model (4) by the logit maximum likelihood method to obtain jˆ . 
In the second step, we estimate equation (9) by ordinary least squares (OLS) after 
substituting jˆ  for  jˆ
6
.
Estimation of the multinomial logit model in the first step is based on the 
assumption that probabilities of the alternative choices are independent of each other. 
In other words, removing any of the alternatives in the model should not alter the 
relative probabilities of choosing the remaining alternatives. This is commonly 
known as the property of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Available 
tests for IIA start from the premise that if a subset of choices is truly irrelevant, 
omitting them from the model will not change the estimates using the remaining 
choices systematically. We have chosen to use Small and Hsiao (1985) test for the 
IIA assumption. Table 1 displays the results concerning this test using specification 
of equation (4) described in the next section. It appears that the IIA assumption holds 
in all cases. In other words, adding or deleting choices does not affect the odds 
among the remaining choices, and the multinomial logit is the correct model choice.
4. Description of data and variables
The data used in this study were taken from the 1994-2001 French Labour 
Force Survey conducted by INSEE7. This survey has the advantage of specifically 
identifying the nonprofit status of worker.
The sample has been selected to include all employees between the ages of 16 
and 65 with a permanent contract. Moreover, we have restricted our attention to 
6
 The corrected variance-covariance matrix has been derived following the method presented in Lee, 
Maddala and Trost (1980).
7
 INSEE is the French National Institute for Statistics and Economics Studies.
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services sector because nonprofit organizations only move in this sector. In the sector 
of services, our analysis is also limited to sub-sectors in which the three institutional 
forms – nonprofit, for-profit and public – coexist8. The rationale for the last selection 
criterion is that we wish to consider homogeneous production techniques and 
hopefully similar types of jobs. Finally, the working sample consists of 93 008 
observations. Of these, 11 723 refer to individuals in the nonprofit sector, 25 009 in 
the for-profit sector and 56 276 in the public sector.
In the wage equations, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly 
net wage on the main job. Hourly net wage is calculated as net earnings in the last 
month divided by 4.33 multiplied by the usual weekly working hours. Some wage 
premia are not included in this hourly net wage. These premia correspond to any 
sums of money not paid monthly like thirteen month’s salary, Christmas bonus and 
so on. Nominal values are converted into real terms with a base period of 1990. The 
explanatory variables assumed to influence wages include sex, marital status, number 
of children, age, dummy variables for education, tenure at current job9, dummy 
variable indicating if individuals work part-time, occupation, size of firm measured 
by the number of employees, dummy variable signalling if individuals are employed 
in the Paris Area, and some working conditions (types of working hours).
The variables included in the choice of the sector equation are the explanatory 
variables of the potential log hourly net wage10. Moreover, to achieve identification 
of the selection model, it is necessary to include additional variables, called 
“instruments”, which influence sector choice but have no direct effects on wages 
(i.e., variables in Z which are not in X). Many instruments are suggested.
According to Weisbrod (1983), socioeconomic backgrounds are hypothesized 
to influence sector’s choice. We use the father’s occupation as a proxy of 
socioeconomic backgrounds. We include two dummy variables. The first signals if 
the worker has a father who works in the public sector. The second indicates if the 
worker has a father who holds an occupation in the private sector (nonprofit or for-
profit) rather directed to social welfare improvement. The occupations in the for-
profit sector which we have considered rather directed to social welfare improvement 
8
 For example, we have excluded sub-sectors like « Transport, storage and communications » and 
« Financial intermediation » where nonprofit organizations are almost inactive.
9
 Tenure is obtained as the difference between the year of the survey and the year of the start of the 
current job.
10
 However, job tenure is not considered in the choice of the sector equation because selection must 
precede tenure at current job.
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are for example managers in social and community services, health and social work 
associate professionals, personal services clerks (like nursing auxiliaries), creative 
and performing artists. These occupations are mainly present in sectors like health, 
social services, art and culture where the provision of social benefits is important. 
Workers engaged in these sectors can derive direct non pecuniary benefits because 
they have a real concern about the recipient of the services. We expect that having a 
father who holds an occupation in the private sector rather directed to social welfare 
improvement will positively influence the probability of selecting nonprofit sector.
We also create two variables indicating the proportion of nonprofit employment 
and the proportion of public employment in the services sector total employment 
when the worker has been hired in his current job. The idea is that, according to their 
year of hire, workers may have greater access to nonprofit and public sectors and 
presumably lower cost of entry. More particularly, in France, during the 1980s, the 
Socialist government has supported the emergence of the nonprofit sector and hence 
the employment in this sector as mechanism through which to implement 
decentralization and as an important tool for social policy.
Finally, we include a dummy variable measuring if the organization offers non-
monthly wage premia. The idea is that nonprofit workers, because of their 
preferences for social benefits, are less attracted to this kind of reward than their for-
profit and public counterparts.
Table 2 offers summary descriptive statistics of the sample by sector. It shows 
many significant differences between sectors. For example, public workers earn on 
average 2.7 per cent more than nonprofit workers who, in turn, earn on average 1.9 
per cent more than for-profit workers. There are more part-time workers and female 
employees in nonprofit sector than in other sectors. Compared to for-profit workers, 
nonprofit and public workers are older, much more highly educated and have higher 
job tenure.
5. Empirical results
5.1 Choice and wage equations
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The marginal effect of each variable on the probability of selecting each sector 
is given in table 3. Several features are worth noting about these effects. As can be 
seen in the bottom of table 3, the variables not used in the wage equations have the 
expected signs. The proportion of nonprofit (respectively public) employment in the 
services sector total employment influences positively and significantly the 
probability of selecting the nonprofit (respectively public) sector. Having a father 
who works in the public sector is associated with a significantly greater probability 
of being employed in the public sector in line with results on the importance of 
cultural transmission. This result is in accordance with the one obtained by Audier 
(2000) and Fougère and Pouget (2003) for France. In the same way, having a father 
who works in the private sector but holds an occupation rather directed to social 
welfare improvement influences positively and significantly the probability of 
selecting the nonprofit and public sectors. Other things equal, nonprofit workers are 
less likely to be attracted by non-monthly wage premia (variable “bonus”) compared 
to their for-profit and public counterparts. This result means that nonprofit 
organizations attract workers who have lower interest in monetary rewards in 
accordance with labour donation theory.
The results for the explanatory variables used in the wage equations also merit 
some remarks. Being employed part-time increases the probability of selecting the 
nonprofit sector. Youngers are more likely to be for-profit workers. Considering the 
level of education, estimates show that education significantly increases the 
individual’s likelihood of being employed in the public sector. Managers have a 
higher probability of selecting the nonprofit sector while being technicians or 
employees reduces the likelihood of being in the for-profit sector.
Using the estimation procedure presented in section 3, the results from table 3 
(the coefficients but not the marginal effects) are used to estimate the wage equations 
with selectivity correction presented in table 4. Selection terms are statistically 
significant, except for the for-profit sector. The sectors’ choice is then endogenous. A 
negative (positive) estimated coefficient on selection term implies that workers who 
choose the considered sector have unobserved characteristics which lead them to 
earn more (less) than a person randomly drawn from the population and assigned to 
this sector. The human capital variables have the expected signs in the three sectors. 
Age and job tenure imply the familiar inverted-U shaped wage profile. Returns to 
education are similarly positively significant. Female workers, compared to male 
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workers, receive lower wages. Variables like the number of children, or being 
married, have also a positive impact on wages. The same is true for characteristics 
like working in the Paris area or in a large firm (except for the public sector) that 
imply higher wages.
5.2 Economy-wide wage differentials
In a selection model involving more than two choices, the conditional wage 
differentials (defined as the difference between a worker’s expected wage in his 
preferred sector and his expected wage in his less preferred sector) cannot be 
estimated because some of the covariance terms required are not identified (see, 
Gyourko et Tracy, 1988, pp. 240-241). We can only estimate the unconditional wage 
differentials between nonprofit, for-profit and public sectors. These wage 
differentials do not take account the average selection effects. Consequently, the 
impossibility of calculating the conditional wage differentials somewhat restricts the 
interpretation of the presented wage differentials. 
Unconditional wage differentials between nonprofit, for-profit and public 
sectors are presented in figure 1 and are estimated as follows
1001
)ˆexp(
)ˆexp(
1001)(ln
)(ln
×








=×








=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(11)
jiW   corresponds to the difference in the returns for the observed 
characteristics of the average worker of sector i in the labour market sectors j and i. 
In other words, this unconditional wage differential compares on average what the 
workers of sector i would have earned if they had to work in sector j with what they 
earn in sector i. For example, the first wage differential presented in figure 1 
( fppuW  =-9.5%) compares on average what the public workers ( pui = ) would 
have earned if they had to work in for-profit sector ( fpj = ) with what they earn in 
public sector.
The two wage differentials in the bottom of figure 1 support the Preston’s 
theoretical model. In fact, nonprofit workers would have earned 20.1% and 11.5% 
more if they had to work in public sector and for-profit sector respectively. In this 
sense, our study allows to test more extensively the labour donation theory compared 
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to previous studies because it shows that nonprofit workers are willing to work at 
lower wage that they could have obtained not only in the for-profit sector but also in 
the public one. In contrast, public workers have chosen the best profitable sector. 
Considering the for-profit workers, they would have obtained a supplementary wage 
benefit of 6.9% in joining the public sector and a wage penalty of 13.0% in joining 
the nonprofit sector11. 
These results suggest a higher pro-social motivation among nonprofit workers 
than among for-profit and public workers. However, the wage differentials between 
nonprofit and for-profit sectors may also reflect unmeasured compensating wage 
differentials across these two organizational forms. For-profit organizations may pay 
relatively high wages because they offer compensating wage differentials for higher 
levels of job stress resulting from a greater competitive work environment. In fact, 
French and Dunlap (1998) found a significant wage premium attributable to job 
stress. Moreover, nonprofit organizations may offer lower wages in return to higher 
job security, given the common assumption that the labour market is dominated by 
risk averse workers rather risk seekers. However, Lanfranchi and Narcy (2008) show 
that, compared to for-profit workers, nonprofit workers are not significantly more 
satisfied with the work load, work tension, job stress and job security, other things 
being equal. More generally, several studies reveal that nonprofit workers enjoy a 
higher overall job satisfaction than their for-profit counterparts because they gain 
higher intrinsic utility from their work (Benz, 2005; Lanfranchi and Narcy, 2008…).
More surprisingly, the results seem to show a lack of pro-social motivation 
among public workers even though they are engaged in the production of services 
that have a social value. However, the wage settlements in the French public sector 
are very different from the ones observed in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors. In 
fact, public pay levels reflect mostly policy orientation and public budgetary 
constraint. Moreover, the compensation is set by statute with the same pay scales 
applying to all public workers. Hence, contrary to nonprofit and for-profit workers, it 
is very difficult for socially motivated workers to donate a portion of the wages they 
earn even though they would be willing to do so. Therefore, the estimation of wage 
11
 The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of fixed term contracts in the sample. In fact, the results 
would have been as follows. The nonprofit workers would have earned +19.9% and +10.1% more if 
they had to work in public sector and for-profit sector respectively. Considering the for-profit workers, 
they would have obtained a supplementary wage benefit of 5.1% of joining the public sector and a 
wage penalty of 14.5% in joining the nonprofit one. If the public workers would have obtained a wage 
loss of 20.4% and of 10.7% if they had been paid like nonprofit and for-profit workers respectively.
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may not be the most relevant way to assess pro-social motivation among public 
workers.
Indeed, donations of labour come in many forms and public organizations may 
then receive labour donations in a non monetary manner. Donated labour may be 
also defined as additional effort that goes beyond that required to maintain a standard 
career path. In this sense, unpaid overtime, e.g., extra hours for which workers do not 
receive any direct or indirect financial compensation, can be considered as an another 
proxy of donated labour. Hence, it would be very interesting to compare the 
magnitude of unpaid overtime between nonprofit, for-profit and public sectors12. 
The economy-wide wage differentials can represent an average of wage 
differentials that occur with different magnitudes across different occupations and 
industries. To investigate this possibility, we turn to an estimation of wage 
differentials between nonprofit, for-profit and public sectors within different 
occupations and industries.
5.3 Wage differentials within occupations and industries
We next examine wage differentials between nonprofit, for-profit and public 
sectors within occupations and specific industries. To do so, these wage differentials 
are calculated using the estimated coefficients of the original model. 
Table 5 displays results for occupations. The findings are generally consistent 
with the ones obtained in the whole economy and presented in figure 1. We can 
observe in the bottom of table 5 that, whatever their occupations, nonprofit workers 
would have earned more if they had to work in public and for-profit sectors. This 
indicates some cope for labour donations by each occupation. These labour donations 
are greater for managers and blue collars than they are for technicians, supervisors 
and employees, more particularly when we consider what nonprofit workers would 
have earned if they had to work in for-profit sector. These results seem to be in 
accordance with the argument developed by Preston (1989). In fact, Preston 
postulated that workers with more control over (like managers) and contact with 
social benefits production (like blue-collars) are willing to donate more labour. 
12
 Unfortunately, the unpaid overtime of workers cannot be observed in the Labour Force Survey.
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Considering the other wage differentials, we can observe that for-profit 
managers would have obtained the same wage if they had to work in public sector. In 
the same way, the wage penalty of public workers in joining the for-profit sector is 
lower for managers than it is for the others occupations. These two results seem to be 
consistent with the analysis of Lucifora and Meurs (2006) in which they observe that 
high skilled public workers are paid lower wages with respect to their for-profit 
counterparts.
It is also interesting to examine the disparities in wage levels in some 
industries. In fact, as Preston argues, the nonprofit wage penalty should be smaller
within specific industries since organizations engaged in the same activities may 
generate more comparable social benefits and have more similar working conditions. 
Table 6 summarizes the results for three industries – education; health and social 
work; other community, social and personal services – where there is a sufficient mix 
of nonprofit, for-profit and public employment.
The findings are again generally consistent with the ones obtained in the whole 
economy. The one exception is that there exists no public/for-profit wage differential 
within other community, social and personal service activities. More precisely, the 
results show that the nonprofit/for-profit wage differential is smaller in health and 
social work than in two other industries. This difference is not really surprising 
because the magnitude of the nonprofit/for-profit wage differential depends on the 
social benefits differentials between the nonprofit and for-profit organizations 
(Preston, 1988). Within health and social work industry, the social benefits 
associated with the service are high, but the social benefits differentials between 
nonprofit and for-profit firms are likely to be small. Therefore, within this sector, for-
profit employees are also willing to accept decreased compensation in order to work 
in a sector providing high social benefits. However, the persistence of a nonprofit 
wage penalty even within an industry performing socially desirable activities 
suggests that an organization that does not have a residual claimant can have a 
distinct advantage to obtain donations of labour from socially motivated workers. 
The estimation of public-for-profit wage differential within health and social work 
industry confirms the for-profit workers’ inclination to donate labour within this
sector. In fact, the magnitude of the public/for-profit wage differential is higher 
within health and social work industry than within two other industries. This result 
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also suggests that the public sector wage setting seems to be independent of the 
industry’s capacity to generate social benefits. 
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have been interested in estimating wage differentials between 
French nonprofit, for-profit and public sectors. More precisely, we have attempted to 
measure the relationship between organizational form and donated labour defined as 
workers’ propensity to accept lower wages in return for assisting with production 
they find social value. 
Our results support the Preston’s labour donation theory more extensively than 
previous American studies that have overlooked the public sector. In fact, nonprofit 
workers are willing to work at lower wage than they could have obtained not only in 
the for-profit sector but also in the public one. Hence, the nonprofit sector seems to 
attract workers who have a strong commitment to the nonprofits’ social objective and 
a subordinate interest in monetary gains. Therefore, nonprofit workers may report 
higher levels of pro-social motivation than for-profit and public counterparts do. On 
the contrary, our results suggest a lack of pro-social motivation among public 
workers even though they are engaged in the production of services that have a social 
value.
However, labour donations may come in many forms and public organizations 
may receive labour donations from their workers in a non monetary manner. For 
example, public workers may exhibit higher pro-social motivation than for-profit and 
nonprofit counterparts if they offer longer unpaid overtime, other things being equal. 
More generally, in order to provide further empirical evidence on relationship 
between organizational form and pro-social behaviour, it would be interesting to 
complement this research by performing analysis using other labour donations 
measures. This remains an area for further work.
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Table 1 - Small-Hsiao test of the IIA assumption
Sector omitted lnL[full] lnL[omit] SH P>chi2 Evidence
For-profit sector -1,35E+4 -1,35E+4 42,830 0,170 for H0
Nonprofit sector -2,07E+4 -2,07E+4 26,360 0,853 for H0
Public sector -1,05E+4 -1,04E+4 43,260 0,159 for H0
Source: INSEE, French Labour Force Survey (1994 to 2001).
Note: The basic idea of the Small and Hsiao (1985) test is that if the IIA assumption holds, the log-
likelihood for the unrestricted model (lnL[full]) will not be very different from the log-likelihood for 
the restricted model (lnL[omit]). This latter model is created by dropping one choice alternative.
The hypotheses are:
H0: IIA assumption is not violated.
H1: IIA assumption is violated.
The test statistics is:
SH=-2[lnL[full]-lnL[omit]]
SH is asymptotically chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
independent variables plus one.
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics
Variable Nonprofit 
sector
For-profit 
sector
Public sector
Log net hourly wage
(in 1990 French Francs)
3.71
(0.32)
3.64
(0.33)
3.83
(0.31)
Part-time work (%) 30.6 23.3 16.0
Female (%) 71.6 63.1 64.1
Married or cohabiting (%) 73.8 71.6 77.2
Number of children 0.8
(1.0)
0.8
(1.0)
0.8
(1.0)
Age (years) 40.8
(9.6)
37.4
(9.9)
41.2
(9.0)
Job tenure (years) 9.5
(7.9)
7.7
(7.8)
14.2
(9.3)
Qualifications (%) :
No qualification 20.6 20.6 18.3
General lower secondary 6.5 8.0 7.2
Vocational lower secondary 26.2 30.0 25.9
High school degree 13.3 16.1 13.3
Undergraduate level 22.0 16.2 19.8
Above undergraduate 11.4 9.1 15.5
Occupations (%) :
Blue-collar 10.3 17.4 10.1
Employee 42.8 46.4 41.7
Technicians, supervisors 36.8 24.7 33.4
Managers 10.1 11.5 14.8
Firm sizes (%) :
1-9 25.4 37.5 36.8
10-49 23.7 22.7 9.4
50-499 32.1 22.2 20.9
>499 18.8 17.6 32.9
Employed in the Paris area (%) 12.5 22.1 13.2
Working conditions (%) :
Night work 10.7 14.0 14.6
Shift work 7.4 6.3 8.4
Sunday work 32.1 31.4 37.9
Variable working time 30.6 28.2 26.6
Nonprofit employment (%) 8.5 8.8 7.5
Public employment (%) 39.1 36.1 46.1
Father’s occupation (%) :
Public sector 14.2 13.1 18.3
Directed to social welfare improvement 
in private sector
34.9 30.1 31.9
Bonus (%) 36.0 47.0 54.3
N 11 723 25 009 56 276
Source: INSEE, French Labour Force Survey (1994 to 2001).
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3 – Multinomial logit sector choice model (marginal effects)
Variable Nonprofit sector For-profit sector Public sector
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Intercept -0.379 (16.26) 1.048 (32.61) -0.669 (17.75)
Part-time work 0.057 (22.14) 0,050 (12.65) -0.107 (23.40)
Female 0.013 (4.99) -0.003* (0.89) -0.010 (2.36)
Married or cohabiting -0.009 (3.80) -0.011 (2.94) 0.020 (4.82)
Number of children -0.006 (5.39) -0.011 (6.12) 0.017 (8.65)
Age 0.002 (2.30) -0.026 (18.96) 0.024 (14.58)
Age2/100 -0.001* (0.59) 0.027 (16.01) -0.026 (13.28)
Qualifications :
No qualification Ref. Ref. Ref.
General lower 
secondary
-0.006* (1.16) 0.010* (1.52) -0.004* (0.56)
Vocational lower 
secondary
0.005* (1.67) -0.002* (0.46) -0.003* (0.63)
High school degree -0.008 (2.05) -0.008* (1.43) 0.016 (2.43)
Undergraduate level -0.005* (1.01) -0.075 (12.44) 0.080 (11.40)
Above undergraduate -0.032 (6.04) -0.218 (28.57) 0.250 (28.89)
Occupations:
Blue-collar Ref. Ref. Ref.
Employee 0.015 (3.89) -0.077 (15.75) 0.062 (10.38)
Technicians, 
supervisors
0.057 (12.92) -0.086 (14.82) 0.029 (4.24)
Managers 0.023 (4.05) -0.001* (0.31) -0.022 (2.57)
Firm sizes :
1-9 Ref. Ref. Ref.
10-49 0.110 (36.10) 0.109 (24.87) -0.219 (41.46)
50-499 0.093 (33.42) -0.014 (3.43) -0.079 (17.16)
>499 0.022 (6.76) -0.113 (26.82) 0.091 19.21)
Employed in the Paris 
area
-0.014 (4.53) 0.125 (31.89) -0.111 (23.07)
Working conditions :
Night work -0.025 (6.61) 0.032 (6.41) -0.007* (1.29)
Shift work 0.028 (6.35) -0.012* (1.88) -0.016 (2.20)
Sunday work -0.017 (6.51) -0.055 (14.60) 0.072 (16.74)
Variable working time 0.024 (9.70) 0.025 (6.80) -0.049 (11.67)
Nonprofit employment 0.018 (16.60) -0.009 (5.74) -0.009 (5.36)
Public employment -0.001 (3.30) -0.009 (38.86) 0.010 (35.97)
Father’s occupation :
Public sector -0.013 (4.02) -0.068 (15.40) 0.081 (16.15)
Directed to social 
welfare improvement 
in private sector
0.009 (3.88) -0.018 (5.29) 0.009 (2.26)
Bonus -0.066 (29.94) 0.016 (5.10) 0.050 (14.06)
Log likelihood -73 738.03
N 93 008
Source: INSEE, French Labour Force Survey (1994 to 2001).
Note: The specification includes as set of year dummies. Absolute t-values are in parentheses. * not 
significant at 5%. 
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Table 4 – Wage equations estimates with selectivity correction by sector of employment
Variables Nonprofit sector For-profit sector Public sector
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Intercept 2.627 (52.69) 2.780 (97.80) 3.007 (98.67)
Part-time work -0.043 (7.37) -0.04* (11.73) -0.047 (16.70)
Female -0.056 (10.68) -0.061 (18.68) -0.059 (29.42)
Married or cohabiting 0.022 (4.51) 0.014 (4.54) 0.012 (5.97)
Number of children 0.011 (4.67) 0.012 (7.52) 0.023 (23.51)
Age 0.019 (10.08) 0.022 (15.19) 0.014 (15.39)
Age2/100 -0.017 (7.53) -0.021 (12.75) -0.012 (11.16)
Job tenure 0.011 (12.75) 0.011 (14.37) 0.007 (15.15)
Job tenure2/100 -0.010 (3.25) -0.005* (2.34) 0.002* (2.39)
Qualifications :
No qualification Ref. Ref. Ref.
General lower 
secondary
0.117 (12.85) 0.071 (12.43) 0.100 (27.59)
Vocational lower 
secondary
0.146 (24.28) 0.083 (21.04) 0.088 (35.06)
High school degree 0.209 (27.25) 0.139 (28.92) 0.165 (51.06)
Undergraduate level 0.284 (37.65) 0.214 (37.51) 0.225 (62.41)
Above undergraduate 0.297 (31.46) 0.258 (26.20) 0.268 (51.63)
Occupations:
Blue-collar Ref. Ref. Ref.
Employee 0.065 (8.50) 0.034 (7.30) 0.029 (8.94)
Technicians, 
supervisors
0.259 (29.17) 0.207 (36.87) 0.223 (61.52)
Managers 0.385 (36.13) 0.405 (63.26) 0.364 (80.06)
Firm sizes :
1-9 Ref. Ref. Ref.
10-49 0.060 (7.69) 0.021 (4.63) -0.012 (2.67)
50-499 0.071 (9.30) 0.032 (8.27) 0.003* (1.33)
>499 0.085 (12.30) 0.048 (8.66) 0.014 (5.81)
Employed in the Paris 
area
0.086 (13.73) 0.124 (23.63) 0.061 (21.44)
Working conditions :
Night work 0.027 (3.84) 0.016 (3.53) 0.045 (16.81)
Shift work 0.040 (4.82) 0.009* (1.45) 0.032 (9.69)
Sunday work 0.023 (4.58) -0.005* (1.25) 0.032 (14.69)
Variable working time -0.008* (1.75) -0.011 (3.38) 0.013 (6.12)
Selection term -0.072 (5.45) 0.018* (1.21) 0.048 (4.92)
R2 0.57 0.60 0.62
N 11 723 25 009 56 276
Source: INSEE, French Labour Force Survey (1994 to 2001).
Note: The specification includes a set of industry and year dummies. Absolute t-values are in 
parentheses. * not significant at 5%. 
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Figure 1 - What the workers would have earned if they had to work in an 
another sector
Nonprofit sector
Public sector
For-profit sector
Public workers
For-profit workers
Nonprofit workers
-9.5% (0.022)
-19.9% (0.024)
+6.9% (0.018)
-13.0% (0.027)
+20.1% (0.021)
+11.5% (0.027)
Note: Srandard errors are in parentheses and are computed according to the method detailed in Jann (2005). 
All the differentials are significant at 5% level.
Lecture: The public workers would have earned 2.4% more if they had to work in nonprofit sector.
Table 5 - Wage differentials by occupations
Managers Technicians, 
supervisors
Employees Blue-collars
Public workers
For-profit sector -6.0%
(0.024)
-11.0%
(0.024)
-9.4%
(0.021)
-9.8%
(0.020)
Nonprofit sector -22.3%
(0.026)
-18.3%
(0.023)
-19.5%
(0.025)
-23.3%
(0.028)
For-profit workers
Public sector -0.1%*
(0.019)
+8.5%
(0.020)
+7.9%
(0.018)
+6.6%
(0.017)
Nonprofit sector -18.7%
(0.030)
-10.1%
(0.028)
-11.9%
(0.028)
-16.2%
(0.028)
Nonprofit workers
Public sector +21.8%
(0.024)
+18.9%
(0.020)
+19.6%
(0.021)
+24.8%
(0.024)
For-profit sector +20.0%
(0.030)
+7.9%
(0.028)
+11.5%
(0.027)
+17.3%
(0.028)
N 12 405 29 296 40 073 11 234
Source: INSEE, French Labour Force Survey (1994 to 2001).
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed according to the method detailed in Jann 
(2005). * not significant at 5% level.
Lecture: The wage differentials in bold mean that the public managers would have earned 6.0% and 
22.3% less if they had to work in for-profit sector and nonprofit sector respectively.
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Table 6 - Wage differentials for specific industries
Education Health and 
social work
Other community, 
social and personal 
service activities
Public workers
For-profit sector -7.3%
(0.024)
-10.0%
(0.024)
+0.7%*
(0.022)
Nonprofit sector -20.1%
(0.024)
-16.0%
(0.023)
-16.4%
(0.026)
For-profit workers
Public sector +8.6%
(0.020)
+12.1%
(0.019)
-0.8%
(0.019)
Nonprofit sector -13.2%
(0.028)
-7.7%
(0.027)
-16.0%
(0.028)
Nonprofit workers
Public sector +23.1%
(0.022)
+19.5%
(0.021)
+18.8%
(0.024)
For-profit sector +14.4%
(0.029)
+7.8%
(0.027)
+19.2%
(0.028)
N 19 393 27 405 5 528
Source: INSEE, French Labour Force Survey (1994 to 2001).
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed according to the method detailed in Jann 
(2005). * not significant at 5% level.
Lecture: The wage differentials in bold mean that in the education industry the public workers would 
have earned 7.3% and 20.1% less if they had to work for a for-profit organization and a nonprofit 
organization respectively.
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